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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
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          NO. 44231 
 
          Kootenai County Case No.  
          CR-2015-14283 
 
           
          RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
 
     
      Issue 
Has Bowser failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion, either 
by imposing a unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed, upon the jury’s verdict 
finding him guilty of leaving the scene of an injury accident, or by denying his Rule 35 
motion for a reduction of sentence? 
 
 
Bowser Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing 
Discretion 
 
 On August 15, 2015, Bowser consumed alcohol and then drove “in an 
unsafe/uncontrolled manner,” with his friend, Justin, in the passenger seat of the 
 2 
vehicle.  (R., pp.15, 17; PSI, p.18.1)  Bowser swerved off the roadway and crashed into 
a “mailbox post,” causing “an approximate 10 foot 2x12 board with numerous mailboxes 
attached” to smash through the passenger side of the front windshield, which “struck 
Justin in the head,” causing severe injuries.  (R., pp.15-17.)  Bowser fled the scene, 
driving with the 10-foot rail of mailboxes still protruding from the windshield of his 
vehicle, and subsequently left Justin – who was “only semi-conscious” – at Justin’s 
brother’s residence, before again fleeing in the still-damaged vehicle.  (R., pp.15-17.)  
Bowser eventually “parked facing southbound in the northbound lane” of Gem road.  
(R., p.15.)  Witnesses observed Bowser “‘fall’ out of the driver’s position,” and noted that 
he appeared to be intoxicated “based on his unsteady demeanor and the odor of an 
alcoholic beverage about his person.”  (R., pp.15-16.)  Bowser then left his vehicle and 
ran to the highway, where he “was picked up” by an unknown driver.  (R., pp.16-17.)  
Meanwhile, Justin’s brother rushed Justin to the hospital, where Justin was treated for a 
concussion, internal injuries to his wrist, and severe lacerations to his face that required 
sutures.  (R., pp.16-17; PSI, p.3.)  It was noted that Justin “was likely to be admitted to 
[the] hospital due to his injuries.”  (R., p.16.)      
The state charged Bowser with leaving the scene of an injury accident and 
striking a fixture.  (R., pp.70-71.)  The case proceeded to trial and a jury found Bowser 
guilty of both counts.  (R., p.174.)  The district court imposed a unified sentence of five 
years, with two years fixed, for leaving the scene of an injury accident, and a concurrent 
 
                                            
1 PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file “BOWSER, 
Garrett – 44231 - PSI.pdf.”   
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180-day jail sentence for striking a fixture.  (R., pp.182-85.)  Bowser filed a notice of 
appeal timely from the judgment of conviction.  (R., pp.186-89.)  He also filed a timely 
Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence, which the district court denied.  (R., pp.190-
92; 209.)   
Bowser asserts his sentence for leaving the scene of an injury accident is 
excessive in light of his support from family and friends, purported regret, employment 
at All City Construction, 60-day period of sobriety, and because his wife was pregnant.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp.3-5.)  The record supports the sentence imposed.   
When evaluating whether a sentence is excessive, the court considers the entire 
length of the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard.  State v. McIntosh, 160 
Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d 621, 628 (2016); State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 
217, 226 (2008).  It is presumed that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the 
defendant's probable term of confinement.  State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 
P.3d 687, 391 (2007).  Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears 
the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.  McIntosh, 160 Idaho 
at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (citations omitted).  To carry this burden the appellant must show 
the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.  Id.  A sentence is 
reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting 
society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or 
retribution.  Id.  “In deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a 
reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ.”  Id. (quoting Stevens, 146 
Idaho at 148-49, 191 P.3d at 226-27).  Furthermore, “[a] sentence fixed within the limits 
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prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion by the 
trial court.”  Id. (quoting State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982)).  
The maximum prison sentence for leaving the scene of an injury accident is five 
years.  I.C. § 18-8007(2).  The district court imposed a unified sentence of five years, 
with two years fixed, which falls well within the statutory guidelines.  (R., pp.183-85.)  
On appeal, Bowser contends, inter alia, that his sentence is excessive in light of his 
support from family and friends and his ability to maintain employment.  (Appellant’s 
brief, pp.4-5.)  However, Bowser had much of the same support before he committed 
the instant offense, and it did not prevent him either from committing the instant offense 
in August 2015, or from going on to commit the new crimes of DUI and possession of a 
controlled substance in February 2016.  (PSI, pp.9-11, 15, 35, 46, 48, 50.)  Likewise, 
Bowser’s employment did not preclude him from continued criminal offending.  (PSI, 
pp.4-9, 12.)  It is also noteworthy that Bowser’s only long-term employment was working 
“on and off” for his father at All City Construction and that his father had “fired” Bowser 
several times throughout that period of time.  (PSI, pp.12-13, 30.)     
Although Bowser claims that he regrets that his friend was injured, he continues 
to deny that he is responsible for committing the crime of which he was convicted.  (PSI, 
pp.4, 29.)  Furthermore, Bowser’s claim of regret rings hollow in light of the fact that he 
once again chose to endanger others by committing a new DUI (as well as a new crime 
of possession of a controlled substance) while this case was pending.  (PSI, p.9.)  
Bowser’s purported “commitment to sobriety” is likewise suspect, given that, after he 
seriously injured his friend while committing the instant offense in August 2015, he 
continued to use alcohol and marijuana for over six months – even after committing the 
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new crimes of DUI and possession of a controlled substance in February 2016.  (PSI, 
pp.9, 13, 31.)  Indeed, during his substance abuse evaluation, conducted on April 11, 
2016, Bowser admitted he had used both alcohol and marijuana in the previous month, 
and also stated that he had used marijuana 42 out of the 90 days preceding the 
evaluation.  (PSI, pp.29, 31-32.)  He also failed to participate in any self-help group 
meetings or substance abuse treatment programs during the nine months between his 
commission of the instant offense and sentencing in this case,2 and told both the 
substance abuse evaluator and the presentence investigator that he “did not think 
substance use treatment was needed.”  (PSI, pp.14, 31-32.)   
At sentencing, the district court articulated the correct legal standards applicable 
to its decision and also set forth its reasons for imposing Bowser’s sentence.  (5/11/16 
Tr., p.413, L.6 – p.414, L.15; p.416, L.9 – p.420, L.16.)  The state submits that Bowser 
has failed to establish an abuse of discretion, for reasons more fully set forth in the 
attached excerpt of the sentencing hearing transcript, which the state adopts as its 
argument on appeal.  (Appendix A.)  
Bowser next asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying his 
Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence.  (Appellant’s brief, p.6.)  If a sentence is 
within applicable statutory limits, a motion for reduction of sentence under Rule 35 is a 
plea for leniency, and this court reviews the denial of the motion for an abuse of 
discretion.  State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho, 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007).  To 
                                            
2 Although Bowser claimed, at sentencing, that he “made contact with ACES” in order to 
sign up for outpatient treatment, it is noteworthy that he did not seek treatment for 
approximately eight months following his commission of the instant offense; instead, he 
waited until just a few weeks before sentencing to do so.  (5/11/16 Tr., p.410, Ls.10-13; 
PSI, p.29.) 
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prevail on appeal, Bowser must “show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or 
additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule 
35 motion.”  Id.  Bowser has failed to satisfy his burden.   
Bowser argues that his sentence should have been reduced in light of his 
placement in a work facility, intention to participate in programs, and because he had 
been “staying out of trouble” for approximately two and one-half months since he had 
been incarcerated.  (Appellant’s brief, p.6.)  None of this was “new” information that 
showed he was entitled to a reduction of sentence.  The district court was aware, at the 
time of sentencing, that Bowser wished to obtain his GED; Bowser told the presentence 
investigator that he had already “completed some courses but still needs to complete 
the math portion.”  (PSI, p.12.)  Bowser also indicated, at sentencing, his willingness to 
participate in rehabilitative programs.  (5/11/16 Tr., p.410, Ls.8-17.)  As such, Bowser’s 
intention to participate in programs while incarcerated was not “new” information before 
the district court.  Bowser’s placement in a work facility is likewise not “new” information 
that supports a reduction of sentence, as the placement of inmates lies within the 
discretion of the Idaho Department of Correction, and the district court was aware, at 
the time of sentencing, that Bowser’s risk to reoffend was in the low-moderate range, 
which made it likely that Bowser would be placed in a lower security facility.  (PSI, 
pp.15, 43-44.) 
With respect to Bowser’s claim that he was entitled to a reduction of sentence 
because he had been “staying out of trouble” while incarcerated, acceptable behavior is 
no less than what is expected of inmates committed to the Department of Correction.  
Moreover, in State v. Cobler, 148 Idaho 769, 773, 229 P.3d 374, 378 (2010), the Idaho 
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Supreme Court held that where, as here, a defendant presented no other new 
information in support of his Rule 35 motion, the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in giving little or no weight to the defendant’s good behavior while in prison (a 
trial court's denial of defendant's motion for reduction of sentence was not an abuse of 
discretion; defendant's prison behavior did not provide valid grounds for a reduction in 
sentence).  Bowser’s short period of acceptable conduct while incarcerated does not 
outweigh the seriousness of the offense, the danger he poses to the community, his 
failure to be deterred from ongoing criminal behavior (even after committing the instant 
offense), and his failure to rehabilitate despite having been afforded numerous prior 
opportunities for treatment. 
In this case, the district court noted that Bowser’s argument in support of his 
request for sentence reduction “only addresses the rehabilitation aspect of sentencing.  
…  Obviously, [in] this case protection of the public is – is a large factor as well.”  
(7/29/16 Tr., p.11, Ls.12-15.)  “When a court reasonably determines that other 
sentencing objectives outweigh the goal of rehabilitation, the court does not abuse its 
discretion in denying a motion for leniency under Rule 35.”  State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 
814, 825, 965 P.2d 174, 185 (1998).  In denying Bowser’s Rule 35 motion, the court 
adhered to its belief that the objective of protection of society was the overriding factor 
in this case.  Clearly, Bowser’s behavior in the instant offense presented a great danger 
to the community, and in fact caused serious harm to his passenger.  His conduct 
thereafter in committing a new DUI offense demonstrates that Bowser continues to 
present a grave risk to society.  The state submits that by failing to establish his 
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sentence was excessive as imposed, Bowser has also failed to establish that the district 
court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence. 
 
Conclusion 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Bowser’s conviction and 
sentence and the district court’s order denying Bowser’s Rule 35 motion for a reduction 
of sentence. 
       
 DATED this 2nd day of June, 2017. 
 
 
 
      __/s/_Lori A. Fleming____________ 
      LORI A. FLEMING 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
      VICTORIA RUTLEDGE 
      Paralegal 
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I consider Is his employment. He is employed as a foreman 1 The LSI·R comes back to low as moderate ·· or 
2 at All Oty Construction. That's something that shows 2 low moderate, I guess, they're hedging their bets, 
3 that he Is able to maintain employment aod that's 3 but •• and that also Indicates he's amenable to 
4 something he's been working at for a period of time and 4 community-based supeivlslon. 
s has a good sklll set In. That does point to his ability s The thing that really stood out to me In 
6 to maintain In the community consistency and things 6 reading the PSI and Just knowing Garrett Is, while maybe 
7 required to keep employment. 7 not a specific Toohill factor, Is his motivation to 
8 The next thing I would asl< the Court to 8 change. And we can't sit here and change the history 
9 consider In fashioning this sentence Is his engagement 9 that Garrett brings to the table here today, but what we 
10 In treabnent. The GAIN recommends outpatient •• exaise 10 have that's different than the times he's been In court 
11 me, yeah, outpatient community-based treabnent at level 11 before, Is his motivation to really change what's going 
12 2.1. Garrett has made contact with ACES In order to 12 on In his life. This event OCOJrred back In August of 
13 begin doing that recommendation. He signed up, I 13 2015, It's certainly been a bumpy road up until falrfy 
14 believe, a little while ago and ts waiting to get that 14 recently as to what was going on with Garrett. 
IS BPA funding so he can engage In that treatment. And, 15 What I can point to the Court what has changed 
16 again, that Is a rommunlty·based treatment that Is 16 for Garrett Is that he Is expecting his first child. I 
17 recommended. 17 know the Court doesn't want to consider that as a facb:lr 
18 While It's still fairly new, the PSI, and 18 for sentencing; for Garrett that is a big motivation to 
19 speaking to Garrett, he's been able to maintain hls 19 change. The Court saw It In the letters that are 
20 sobriety slnoe February 26th, 2016. I think that puts 20 attached to the PSI, the statements made by Garrett In 
21 us at roughly a little short of 60 days at this point. 21 the PSI. That's something that's very significant to 
22 That's something that Garrett's re.ally proud of. It was 22 him. Something that really Impacts how he wants to move 
23 40 at the time ~ the PSI and I checked with him this 23 forward In his future. 
24 afternoon and that's something he's been able to 24 The thing that's not touched on In the PSI, 
25 maintain. 25 and I'm going to share with the Court, Is the loss of a 
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1 friendship, too. Garrett was really good friends with 1 signed up to do at ACES to address the underlying 
2 his passenger that got hurt. That's a relationship In a 2 alcohol •• thank you, your Honor. 
3 very small community that Is very lmpactful. 3 Oh, and we don't object to the State's request 
4 You know, they •• while there's no animosity 4 to keep restitution open for a reasonable period of 
s necessarily, they're not friends. They don't hang out. s time. 
6 They're not spending the weekends together. They're not 6 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
7 ftshlng. They're not hunting. They're not doing those 7 Mr. Bowser, the Court having accepred the 
8 things that's really Important, I think, in a small 8 Jury's verdict that you were guilty of the offenses of 
9 community and something that was really Important to 9 leaving the scene of an Injury accident, a felony, and 
10 Garrett. So there was a loss there as well. 10 also the striking of a fixture, a misdemeanor. It's the 
11 He has credit for only one day In thls case, 11 Judgment of the Court that you are guilty of those 
12 your Honor. We are asking the Court to consider u offenses. The Court has four factors of sentencing In 
13 probation, but we recognize there needs to be a sanction 13 mind that has to be considered In each case and I 
14 for the conduct. 14 consider them In your case. And the first of those 
15 We're asking the Court to consider imposition 15 factors Is how to best protect society with a sentence 
16 of some local Jail time. Actually, to satl$fy that 16 that's given. 
17 punitive aod deterrence factor that needs to be a 17 Another factor I have to think about Is what 
18 consideration for this Court. But when we look at the 18 will deter you from criminal ronduct? What will 
19 rehabflltatlon and look at the rommunlty safety and we 19 ronvlnce you to change your lifestyle based on a 
20 look at •• consider the least restrictive means that 20 sentence that's given. Also, what would deter another 
21 needs to be considered by the Court to address those 21 person who Is In a slmllar situation of yours from 
22 Toohill factors, we stlll believe that Garrett Is an 22 rommlttfng new offenses. 
23 amenable candidate for probation. That sanction and 23 So I Just don't have to take Into 
24 deterrence can be satisfied with local Incarceration and 24 ronsfderatlon your circumstances, I have to think about 
25 that he can engage In rommunlty·based treatment as he 25 other people that are plllng •• complllng records like 
412 413 
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1 this one and what might change their behavior If they 1 mind when we got •• when we got In the accident was to 
2 were aware of this sentence. 2 get him help, to get him help. And I got him to his 
3 A third factor Is what addresses the 3 brother's house and that whole situation there was 
4 punishment that society expects under all these 4 cr<W{. But I knew Justin was going to get help because 
5 circumstances. 5 his brother was taking him to the hospital. I mean, 
6 And then lastly, but an Important one, Is how 6 there's not •• I don't know there's any other thing I 
7 to help any rehab!Utatlon that can be aided by a 7 posslbly could have done. And •• yeah, and then I was 
8 sentence. And I do have those factors In mind. 8 headed to my dad's house from thefe and then my vehlde 
9 I do give you aedlt for the one day that you 9 broke down. 
10 served of Incarceration leading up to today's 10 THE COURT: Okay. 
11 sentencing. 11 THE DEFENDANT: And I just - you know, don't 
12 You know what I've never heard from you In 12 get me wrong, I wanted to get him help. But, yeah, then 
13 this case Is what were you doing when you drove back to 13 there's the other part where It's, llke, now I don't 
14 Mr. Odeklrk's brother's house and t11ed to yank that 14 want to get In trouble, you know what I mean. There's a 
15 post out of the windshield and then left, 15 million things that were going through my mind at the 
16 Where were you going? What were you doing? 16 time, but I did everything I could do to get him help. 
17 THE DEFENDANT: I was going to my father's 17 THE COURT: All right. 
18 house. 18 THE DEFENDANT: I mean, this Is my best 
19 THE COURT: Why were you going to your 19 friend. I wasn't going to leave him. I would have 
20 father's house? 20 never left him. Even If he wasn't my best friend, but 
21 THE DEFENDANT: Because that's where I was 21 he was my best friend. I did not leave him. 
22 living at the time and nobody·· I don't know. I was 22 THE COURT: Well, and I can understand that. 
23 just •• there was a million things that was going 23 I can understand what you're saying •• 
24 through my mind at the time and, you know, don't get me 24 THE DEFENDANT: Maybe·· sorry. Sorry for 
25 wrong, you know, the first thing that went through my 2S Interrupting. 
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1 THE COURT: It's all right. Go ahead. 1 In 2005, you get a resisting arrest and a 
2 THE DEFENDANT: But maybe there's a mllllon 2 minor In possession of alcohol. So there's dearly some 
3 other things I could have done at the time, but nobody 3 significant aloohol Issues going on here with crlmlnal 
4 knows what you're going to do until you're In that 4 offenses even before you're 19 years old. 
5 situation and - 5 By age 19 there's another misdemeanor aiding 
6 THE COURT: AH right. 6 and a misdemeanor, I don't really know what that Is. 
7 THE DEFENDANT: I don't know. I feel terrible 7 By 21 there's this open container oonviction. 
8 that everything happened the way It did. 8 The same year there's some reckless driving. 
9 THE COURT: Well, I an acx:ept that 9 Now, we have problems with alcohol and some 
10 explanation. And there's some thoughts about that that 10 problems with driving are really starting to be part of 
11 ru express here In Just a moment. 11 this pattern. That's reduced to an Inattentive drMng 
12 The record •• the almlnal history has got to 12 In Shoshone County. 
13 be taken Into oonsideration here. And It goes back •• 13 So you've had some breaks already now. You've 
14 It started at age 18, just your adult a1mlnal history, 14 missed a DUI. You've missed a reckless conviction. 
15 you get a DUI charge In 2004 and It got reduced down to 15 Those are real breaks for you. 
16 an Inattentive driving. And a lot of times maybe 16 In the same year you get "Encouraging a 
17 there's not much evidence or a lot (I times It's 17 juvenile to come within the purview of the juvenile 
18 because, Well, he's a young man, let's give him a break. 18 justice" I can't remember that exactly. Usually that's 
19 Let's not saddle him with a DUI, let's give him an 19 you're with a minor that's drinking. That's usually 
20 rnattentlve driving. 20 what that means. 
21 There was also a battety Involved In that. 21 So at age 22 you get a burglary charge In 
22 There was a minor In possession of alcohol because you 22 Benewah County. That's reduced to a petit theft. You 
23 were only 18. 23 get another break. 
24 In the same year you get another minor In 24 Now you've missed a DUI. You've missed a 
25 possession of alcohol. 25 reddess driving. You've missed a burglary. But what I 
416 417 
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1 don't see, Mr. Bowser, Is I don't see any change In 1 bizarre case with your fr1end pinned In the car with 
2 behavior. You're getting all these breaks and the 2 that pole smashed up against him and mailboxes are 
3 behavior doesn't change because In the same year you get 3 hanging out of your windshield and the Injury that he 
4 another petlt theft conviction. So now we're looking at 4 had and blood all over the plaoe. One would think that 
5 you're drinking a lot, you're driving badly, endangering 5 If there was ever the rock bottom this Is It. But 
6 people, and you're stealing things. 6 apparently It's not It because you get a new DUI and a 
7 2009 In Seattle you get a burglary charge and 7 new controlled substance conviction In Benewah C.ounty 
8 conviction. so ·· It looks like. I don't know If It 8 even after this. 
9 was a misdemeanor or not. It's a misdemeanor burglary 9 You still owe Benewah C.ounty a couple thousand 
10 In Washington. You only do 30 days, but behavior hasn't 10 dollars, $2,500, In past fines and fees, so you haven't 
1l changed. 11 paid up on your financial obligations. And I Just don't 
12 By age 23 you get the felony possession of 12 see any change In behavior here. 
13 marijuana that you end up being on probation on. 13 Probation Is designed to help rehabllltatlon. 
14 Behavior doesn't change. You're using drugs While on 14 Rehabllltatton has come and gone now. You've had many, 
15 probation and off to the penltentlary you go after a 15 many, many, many chances to get this changed around. 
16 rider. After a rider and then probatlon. 16 You're almost 30 years old and there's been no change at 
17 2013 In Kootenai County you get a grand theft: 17 all. 
18 charge. That's reduced to a petit theft:. SO you miss 18 I hear you say that now you're ready for 
19 another felony and you get a break and some time In the 19 change and I hope that's the case. I want that to be 
20 county jail. Your behavior doesn't change. 20 the case. But that doesn't mean you're going to get 
21 You get a DUI conviction In the same year. Ari 21 probation at all. It's just absolutely not In the cards 
22 unlawful entry oonvlctlon In the same year. 22 for you on this one. 
23 And then the •• this case In August of 2015. 23 So the Issue really comes down to the PSI 
24 One would think that this case would be just 24 recommends a retained jurisdiction. Retained 
25 the absolute end of the road. I mean, this Is such a 25 jurisdictions are often engaged in to both help a person 
418 419 
1 get some treatment and some rehabllltatlve services, but 1 Any questions from the State? 
2 to also kind of monitor how Is that person going to do 2 MS. GARDNER: No, your Honor. 
3 on probatl0n7 How might they do? You've already 3 THE COURT: Ally questions from the defense? 
4 demonstrated how you do on probatlon; you use drugs, you 4 MS. CHESEBRO: No, your Honor. 
5 get DUls. You've already given me the demonstration of 5 THE COURT: You're remanded to the bailiff to 
6 how you do on probation. 6 begin the service of this sentence then. With that 
7 Again, It makes no sense to the Court to send 7 you're exo.ised. You're remanded to the ballilf and we 
8 you down on a rider to find out how you might do on 8 are adjourned. 
9 probation; you've already answered that question with 9 (C.ourt adjourned.) 
10 your past behavlorS. 10 
11 So with that, I'm going to impose a prison 11 
12 sentence In this case. The sentence Is going to be a 12 
13 five-year unified sentence; two years fixed followed by 13 
14 three years Indeterminate. The credit for the one day 14 
15 served. rm not retaining jurisdiction. rm not 15 
16 suspending that sentence. 16 
17 On the striking a fixture senl'ence, it will be 17 
18 180 days of Jail, credit for one day served. That's 18 
19 concurrent. So you'll be done with that In the first 19 
20 fe:.v months of your pr1son term. 20 
21 The Department of Transportation Is likely to 21 
22 suspend your driver's license for one year. That's up 22 
23 to them. n1 give the State 90 days to file either a 23 
24 notlce of hearing on a restitution request or a 24 
2S stipulation for restitution. 25 
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